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| 27 | <!-- ### Begin Content ### --> |
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| 28 | <div id="second"> |
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| 29 | |
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| 30 | |
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| 31 | |
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| 32 | <table class="rfc2822 docutils field-list" frame="void" rules="none"> |
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| 33 | <col class="field-name" /> |
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| 34 | <col class="field-body" /> |
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| 35 | <tbody valign="top"> |
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| 36 | <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">BEP:</th><td class="field-body">8</td> |
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| 37 | </tr> |
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| 38 | <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Title:</th><td class="field-body">Tracker Peer Obfuscation</td> |
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| 39 | </tr> |
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| 40 | <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Version:</th><td class="field-body">10851</td> |
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| 41 | </tr> |
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| 42 | <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Last-Modified:</th><td class="field-body"><a class="reference external" href="https://svn.bittorrent.com/trac.cgi/browser/dotorg/trunk/html/beps/bep_0008.rst">2008-02-15 15:04:41 -0800 (Fri, 15 Feb 2008)</a></td> |
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| 43 | </tr> |
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| 44 | <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Author:</th><td class="field-body">David Harrison <dave at bittorrent.com>, Anthony Ciani <tony at ciani.phy.uic.edu>, Arvid Norberg <arvid at bittorrent.com>, Greg Hazel <greg at bittorrent.com></td> |
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| 45 | </tr> |
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| 46 | <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Status:</th><td class="field-body">Draft</td> |
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| 47 | </tr> |
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| 48 | <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Type:</th><td class="field-body">Standards Track</td> |
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| 49 | </tr> |
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| 50 | <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Created:</th><td class="field-body">31-Jan-2008</td> |
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| 51 | </tr> |
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| 52 | <tr class="field"><th class="field-name">Post-History:</th><td class="field-body"></td> |
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| 53 | </tr> |
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| 54 | </tbody> |
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| 55 | </table> |
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| 56 | <hr /> |
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| 57 | <div class="contents topic" id="contents"> |
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| 58 | <p class="topic-title first">Contents</p> |
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| 59 | <ul class="simple"> |
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| 60 | <li><a class="reference internal" href="#announce-parameter" id="id8">Announce Parameter</a></li> |
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| 61 | <li><a class="reference internal" href="#announce-response" id="id9">Announce Response</a></li> |
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| 62 | <li><a class="reference internal" href="#peer-list-obfuscation" id="id10">Peer List Obfuscation</a></li> |
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| 63 | <li><a class="reference internal" href="#optimizations" id="id11">Optimizations</a></li> |
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| 64 | <li><a class="reference internal" href="#backwards-compatibility" id="id12">Backwards Compatibility</a></li> |
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| 65 | <li><a class="reference internal" href="#rationale" id="id13">Rationale</a></li> |
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| 66 | <li><a class="reference internal" href="#references" id="id14">References</a></li> |
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| 67 | <li><a class="reference internal" href="#example-python-code" id="id15">Example Python Code</a></li> |
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| 68 | </ul> |
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| 69 | </div> |
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| 70 | <p>This extends the tracker protocol to support simple obfuscation of the |
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| 71 | peers it returns, using the infohash as a shared secret between the |
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| 72 | peer and the tracker. The obfuscation does not provide any security |
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| 73 | against eavesdroppers that know the infohash of the torrent. The goal |
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| 74 | is to prevent internet service providers and other network |
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| 75 | administrators from blocking or disrupting bittorrent traffic |
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| 76 | connections that span between the receiver of a tracker response and |
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| 77 | any peer IP-port appearing in that tracker response.</p> |
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| 78 | <p>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", |
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| 79 | "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are |
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| 80 | to be interpreted as described in IETF <a class="reference external" href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> <a class="footnote-reference" href="#id6" id="id7">[5]</a>.</p> |
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| 81 | <div class="section" id="announce-parameter"> |
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| 82 | <h1>Announce Parameter</h1> |
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| 83 | <p>When using this extension, instead of passing the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">info_hash</span></tt> parameter |
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| 84 | to the tracker, a <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha_ih</span></tt> is passed.</p> |
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| 85 | <p>The value of <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha_ih</span></tt> MUST be the info-hash of the torrent, with a second |
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| 86 | SHA-1 applied to it.</p> |
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| 87 | <p>For example if a torrent has infohash with hex representation |
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| 88 | <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">aaf4c61ddcc5e8a2dabedef3b482cd9aea9434d</span></tt> then its <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha_ih</span></tt> is |
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| 89 | <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha1(infohash)='6b4f89a54e2d27ecd7e8da5b4ab8fd9d1d8b119'</span></tt>.</p> |
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| 90 | <p>The value MUST be url encoded, just like the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">info_hash</span></tt>. Thus the |
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| 91 | <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha_ih</span></tt> above when url encoded becomes |
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| 92 | <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">kO%89%A5N-%27%EC%D7%E8%DA%05%B4%AB%8F%D9%D1%D8%B1%19</span></tt>.</p> |
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| 93 | <p>This extension does not change the semantics of any parameter passed |
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| 94 | in the peer's announce.</p> |
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| 95 | </div> |
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| 96 | <div class="section" id="announce-response"> |
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| 97 | <h1>Announce Response</h1> |
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| 98 | <p>If the tracker supports this extension, the response should be exactly |
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| 99 | the same as if the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">info_hash</span></tt> had been passed, except that any |
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| 100 | field that contains peer information (such as <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">peers</span></tt>, <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">peers6</span></tt> or |
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| 101 | any other field defined by another extension) MUST be obfuscated as |
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| 102 | described in the next section.</p> |
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| 103 | <p>There are additional parameters the tracker may OPTIONALLY return. |
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| 104 | These are discussed in the <a class="reference internal" href="#optimizations">optimizations</a> section.</p> |
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| 105 | </div> |
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| 106 | <div class="section" id="peer-list-obfuscation"> |
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| 107 | <h1>Peer List Obfuscation</h1> |
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| 108 | <p>We distinguish between the <em>tracker peer list</em> and the <em>returned peer |
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| 109 | list</em>. The <em>tracker peer list</em> contains the ip-port pairs of all |
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| 110 | known peers in a given torrent, i.e., those peers that have reported |
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| 111 | to the tracker that they are transferring the file with a given |
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| 112 | infohash. The tracker may store this peer list however it wishes. |
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| 113 | The <em>returned peer list</em> contains a packed array of ip-port pairs |
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| 114 | conforming to the BitTorrent protocol specification. If the swarm is |
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| 115 | sufficiently large then the returned ip-port pairs constitute a subset |
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| 116 | of the ip-port pairs in the <em>tracker peer list</em>.</p> |
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| 117 | <p>The returned peer list is encrypted using RC4-drop768 encryption using |
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| 118 | the infohash as a shared secret and optionally employing an |
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| 119 | initialization vector.</p> |
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| 120 | <p>For the remainder of this document RC4 refers to RC4-drop768. In the |
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| 121 | process of encryption, RC4 generates a pseudorandom string that is |
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| 122 | XOR'd with the plaintext to generate the ciphertext. The receiver |
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| 123 | recovers the plaintext by generating the same pseudorandom string and |
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| 124 | XOR'ing it with the ciphertext. In generating the pseudorandom |
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| 125 | string, the tracker and client MUST discard the first 768 bytes. The |
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| 126 | next 8 bytes in the pseudorandom string are reserved for optimizations |
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| 127 | discussed in the next section.</p> |
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| 128 | <p>To communicate an initialization vector, the tracker includes in the |
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| 129 | bencoded response the key <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">iv</span></tt> with value set to a byte string |
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| 130 | containing the initialization vector. The initialization vector can |
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| 131 | be of arbitrary length and is sent in plaintext.</p> |
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| 132 | <p>If the tracker sends no initialization vector then the infohash is |
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| 133 | used as the RC4 key (160 bit key). If the tracker provides an |
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| 134 | initialization vector then the RC4 key is generated by appending the |
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| 135 | vector to the infohash and then hashing with SHA-1. The resulting |
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| 136 | hash is then used as the RC4 key.</p> |
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| 137 | <p>For example, given infohash <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">aaf4c61ddcc5e8a2dabedef3b482cd9aea9434d</span></tt> |
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| 138 | and initialization vector <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">abcd</span></tt> both represented in hex, the RC4 key |
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| 139 | is derived as follows:</p> |
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| 140 | <pre class="literal-block"> |
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| 141 | key = sha1( 'aaf4c61ddcc5e8a2dabedef3b482cd9aea9434dabcd' ) |
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| 142 | </pre> |
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| 143 | <p>The resulting key in hex is <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">f36e9cae87cf33e07645ef5ca745a8a83469f31e</span></tt>.</p> |
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| 144 | <p>It is RECOMMENDED that the tracker use the initialization vector, and |
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| 145 | that it change the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">iv</span></tt> on roughly the same period as the rerequest |
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| 146 | interval. The reasoning for this is contained in the rationale.</p> |
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| 147 | </div> |
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| 148 | <div class="section" id="optimizations"> |
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| 149 | <h1>Optimizations</h1> |
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| 150 | <p>The described optimizations are OPTIONAL for the tracker, but the |
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| 151 | corresponding client-side MUST be implemented by clients that support |
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| 152 | this extension. These optimizations hobble the strength of the RC4 |
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| 153 | encryption in order to improve tracker performance. In the <a class="reference internal" href="#rationale">rationale</a> |
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| 154 | section we discuss why hobbling RC4 is reasonable and in many cases |
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| 155 | has negligible foreseen effect on security.</p> |
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| 156 | <p>For the purpose of these optimizations we assume that the tracker |
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| 157 | stores the tracker peer list for each infohash as a packed array that |
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| 158 | can be copied directly into the response. We further assume that the |
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| 159 | packed array is reused many times and that with each request the |
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| 160 | tracker either returns the entire packed array or copies a single |
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| 161 | contiguous substring from the tracker peer list into the response.</p> |
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| 162 | <p>If the peerlist is represented and used as assumed then to improve |
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| 163 | randomness in the set of peers handed out by the tracker, it is |
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| 164 | RECOMMENDED that the tracker periodically reshuffle the peerlist with |
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| 165 | period similar to the rerequest interval. After each reshuffle the |
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| 166 | tracker reperforms the operations described in this section.</p> |
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| 167 | <p>To reduce computation the tracker MAY cache the pseudorandom string |
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| 168 | generated by RC4 and reuse it as peers arrive and depart.</p> |
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| 169 | <p>The tracker MAY also cache the encrypted tracker peer list. To |
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| 170 | support this the tracker MUST pass two additional keys <em>i</em> and <em>n</em> |
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| 171 | each with 32-bit integer values, except the tracker MAY omit <em>i</em> and |
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| 172 | <em>n</em> when <em>i=0</em> and the <em>returned peer list</em> is the entire <em>tracker peer |
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| 173 | list</em>. Whether the tracker returns <em>i</em> and <em>n</em>, the first 8 bytes of |
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| 174 | the RC4 psuedorandom string are reserved for obscuring <em>i</em> and <em>n</em>. |
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| 175 | We come back to this momentarily. Decryption starts by XORing from |
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| 176 | <em>6i</em> bytes for ipv4 (or <em>18i</em> for ipv6) into the pseudorandom string |
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| 177 | after the discarded and reserved bytes. Assuming that the tracker |
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| 178 | encrypted the tracker peer list starting from the first byte after the |
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| 179 | discarded and reserved bytes in the pseudorandom string then <em>i</em> also |
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| 180 | corresponds to the <em>ith</em> ip-port pair in the tracker peer list.</p> |
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| 181 | <p>So that the client and the tracker do not have to generate an |
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| 182 | arbitrarily long pseudorandom string to support large swarms, we |
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| 183 | assume the tracker bounds the length of the pseudorandom string and |
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| 184 | reports the length in ip-port pairs as the value to key <em>n</em>. <em>n</em> |
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| 185 | excludes reserved and discarded bytes. We RECOMMEND that <em>n</em> be equal |
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| 186 | to the length of the tracker peer list or random but within constant |
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| 187 | factor of the longest peerlist returned by the tracker, whichever is |
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| 188 | smaller. Thus the tracker encrypts the <em>jth</em> byte of the <em>ith</em> |
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| 189 | ip-port pair in an ipv4 tracker peer list by XORing with the byte |
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| 190 | <em>(6i+j)</em> <cite>mod</cite> <em>n</em> bytes into the pseudorandom string.</p> |
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| 191 | <p>Transmitting <em>i</em> and <em>n</em> as plaintext would significantly reduce the |
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| 192 | cost for an attacker to recover the pseudorandom string. The tracker |
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| 193 | MUST XOR the value of <em>i</em> with the first 32 bits of the pseudorandom |
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| 194 | string. The tracker then XORs <em>n</em> with the next 32 bits from the |
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| 195 | pseudorandom string (see Figure 1).</p> |
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| 196 | <div class="figure"> |
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| 197 | <img alt="bep_0008_pseudo.png" src="bep_0008_pseudo.png" /> |
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| 198 | <p class="caption"><strong>Figure 1:</strong> The first 768 bytes of the RC4 pseudorandom |
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| 199 | string are discarded. The key <em>i</em> in the tracker response has |
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| 200 | value <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">x</span> <span class="pre">xor</span> <span class="pre">i</span></tt>. The key <em>n</em> has value <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">y</span> <span class="pre">xor</span> <span class="pre">n</span></tt>.</p> |
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| 201 | </div> |
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| 202 | <p>We describe encryption in the following example for an ipv4 tracker peer |
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| 203 | list consisting of 3 ip-port pairs, and using an RC4 pseudorandom string |
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| 204 | of length <em>n=2</em>. <em>n</em> is small for purposes of illustration. Also, for the |
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| 205 | purpose of illustration, the tracker returns only 2 peers at a time.</p> |
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| 206 | <pre class="literal-block"> |
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| 207 | Given the following peer list |
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| 208 | (208.72.193.86, 6881), (209.81.173.15,14321), (128.213.6.8, 6881) |
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| 209 | |
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| 210 | As a packed array represented in hex it becomes |
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| 211 | |
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| 212 | d048c1561ae1d151ad0f37f180d506081ae1 |
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| 213 | |
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| 214 | which we XOR with an RC4 pseudorandom string excluding discarded and |
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| 215 | reserved bytes, e.g., |
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| 216 | |
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| 217 | a496e5f9b83e835013d42226 |
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| 218 | |
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| 219 | to generate |
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| 220 | |
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| 221 | 74de24afa2df5201bedb15d72443e3f1a2df |
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| 222 | </pre> |
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| 223 | <p>Because the RC4 pseudorandom string is shorter than the tracker |
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| 224 | peer list, we wrap to the beginning of the pseudorandom string.</p> |
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| 225 | <p>A tracker returning the first two peers would return the bencoded |
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| 226 | equivalent of:</p> |
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| 227 | <pre class="literal-block"> |
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| 228 | peers=74de24afa2df5201bedb15d7, i=0, n=2 |
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| 229 | </pre> |
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| 230 | <p>A tracker returning the second and third peer would return the |
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| 231 | bencoded equivalent of:</p> |
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| 232 | <pre class="literal-block"> |
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| 233 | peers=5201bedb15d72443e3f1a2df, i=1, n=2 |
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| 234 | </pre> |
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| 235 | <p>In each response the tracker includes additional parameters such as |
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| 236 | the rerequest <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">interval</span></tt> and the initialization vector <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">iv</span></tt>.</p> |
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| 237 | <p>The tracker response MUST remain a valid bencoded message.</p> |
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| 238 | </div> |
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| 239 | <div class="section" id="backwards-compatibility"> |
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| 240 | <h1>Backwards Compatibility</h1> |
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| 241 | <p>Trackers that support obfuscation are identified in the .torrent file |
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| 242 | by the inclusion of an <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">obfuscate-announce-list</span></tt> which otherwise has the |
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| 243 | same semantics as the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">announce-list</span></tt> key. Peers that do not support |
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| 244 | obfuscation simply ignore the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">obfuscate-announce-list</span></tt>.</p> |
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| 245 | <p>A client that is configured to use this extension should always send |
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| 246 | the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha_ih</span></tt> to any tracker supporting obfuscation. The client |
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| 247 | SHOULD only contact trackers in the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">announce-list</span></tt> once the client |
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| 248 | has attempted all trackers in the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">obfuscate-announce-list</span></tt> and all failed.</p> |
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| 249 | <p>If a tracker that supports obfuscation wishes to allow legacy peers to |
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| 250 | connect to the tracker then the announce URL should appear in both the |
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| 251 | <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">obfuscate-announce-list</span></tt> and the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">announce-list</span></tt>.</p> |
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| 252 | <p>If a tracker URL appears in both lists running on the same port, and |
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| 253 | the tracker failed to respond when selected from the |
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| 254 | <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">obfuscate-announce-list</span></tt> then the client MAY treat the tracker in |
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| 255 | the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">announce-list</span></tt> as if it were temporarily unreachable and defer |
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| 256 | trying it until it has tried other trackers in the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">announce-list</span></tt>.</p> |
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| 257 | <p>Peers MUST never send both the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">info_hash</span></tt> and <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha_ih</span></tt> parameters |
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| 258 | in the same request, since that would defeat the purpose of the shared |
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| 259 | secret.</p> |
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| 260 | <p>Any peer that requests with a <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha_ih</span></tt> SHOULD implement Message |
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| 261 | Stream Encryption (MSE) <a class="footnote-reference" href="#mse" id="id1">[1]</a>. Any peer returned from the tracker |
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| 262 | in response to a request with a <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha_ih</span></tt> SHOULD be assumed to |
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| 263 | support Message Stream Encryption. We include these provisions |
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| 264 | because if a peer communicates with another peer without using MSE |
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| 265 | then the BitTorrent protocol is trivially identified from the first |
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| 266 | twenty bytes of the BitTorrent header and the <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">info_hash</span></tt> appears in |
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| 267 | plaintext as the next twenty bytes, hence also defeating the purpose |
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| 268 | of the shared secret.</p> |
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| 269 | <p>If the tracker does not know enough peers assumed to support MSE to |
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| 270 | return the desired number of peers then it MAY include peers that are |
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| 271 | not assumed to support MSE. If a peer closes a connection in response |
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| 272 | to an encrypted header then the initiating peer SHOULD assume that the |
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| 273 | peer does not support MSE. The initiating peer however SHOULD ONLY |
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| 274 | initiate unencrypted connections when all peers have been tried and |
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| 275 | those that support MSE fail to provide "adequate performance." We |
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| 276 | intentionally omit any definition of "adequate performance."</p> |
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| 277 | </div> |
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| 278 | <div class="section" id="rationale"> |
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| 279 | <h1>Rationale</h1> |
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| 280 | <p>This extension directly addresses a known attack on the BitTorrent |
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| 281 | protocol performed by some deployed network hardware. By obscuring |
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| 282 | the ip-port pairs network hardware can no longer easily identify |
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| 283 | ip-port pairs that are running BitTorrent by observing peer-to-tracker |
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| 284 | communications. This deployed hardware under some conditions disrupts |
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| 285 | BitTorrent connections by injecting forged TCP reset packets.</p> |
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| 286 | <p>This hardware was presumably deployed to get around BitTorrent |
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| 287 | Message Stream Encryption <a class="footnote-reference" href="#mse" id="id2">[1]</a>. Peers implementing BitTorrent Message Stream |
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| 288 | Encryption obfuscate peer-to-peer connections by employing RC4 |
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| 289 | encryption on every byte from the first byte transferred. BitTorrent |
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| 290 | Message Stream Encryption thus increases the difficulty for a device |
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| 291 | observing passing packets to identify BitTorrent peer-to-peer |
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| 292 | connections.</p> |
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| 293 | <p>By using the SHA-1 of the infohash, the tracker is able to identify |
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| 294 | torrents without sending the plaintext infohash and without requiring |
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| 295 | an additional prior exchange of a shared secret. Where trackers now |
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| 296 | maintain mappings from infohash to the corresponding torrent's |
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| 297 | peerlist and other torrent-specific state, obfuscated trackers would |
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| 298 | need one additional mapping from <tt class="docutils literal"><span class="pre">sha_ih</span></tt> to the torrent's state. |
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| 299 | Trackers may also cache the encrypted version of each torrent's |
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| 300 | tracker peer list, to increase computational performance at the |
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| 301 | expense of increasing memory footprint by a constant factor.</p> |
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| 302 | <p>The obfuscation method meets the following criteria:</p> |
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| 303 | <ul class="simple"> |
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| 304 | <li>The entire plaintext of the peer list is not easily obtained even if |
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| 305 | an eavesdropper identifies ip-port pairs from subsequent connections |
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| 306 | initiated by a peer that has received a tracker response.</li> |
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| 307 | <li>Even when a subsequent connection from a peer that has received a |
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| 308 | tracker response is observed by an eavesdropper, it is difficult to |
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| 309 | map the ip-port pair to specific ciphertext to verify that the |
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| 310 | connection is using BitTorrent.</li> |
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| 311 | </ul> |
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| 312 | <p>When the <a class="reference internal" href="#optimizations">optimizations</a> are used,</p> |
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| 313 | <ul class="simple"> |
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| 314 | <li>Few computations are performed at request time.</li> |
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| 315 | <li>Encryption may be performed at the time a peer is added. |
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| 316 | The encrypted peer ip and port may be handed out hundreds of times.</li> |
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| 317 | <li>Security is minimally impacted.</li> |
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| 318 | </ul> |
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| 319 | <p>The objective is NOT to create a cryptographically secure protocol |
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| 320 | that can survive unlimited observation of passing packets and |
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| 321 | substantial computational resources on network timescales. The objective |
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| 322 | is to raise the bar sufficiently to deter attacks based on observing |
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| 323 | ip-port numbers in peer-to-tracker communications.</p> |
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| 324 | <p>If a tracker observes a large number of tracker requests and responses |
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| 325 | and subsequent connections, it is possible to attack the encryption. |
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| 326 | RC4 is known to have a number of weaknesses especially in the way it |
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| 327 | was used with WEP <a class="footnote-reference" href="#borisov" id="id3">[2]</a> <a class="footnote-reference" href="#scott" id="id4">[3]</a> <a class="footnote-reference" href="#stubblefeld" id="id5">[4]</a>. However, |
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| 328 | with tracker peer obfuscation, the number of bytes transferred between |
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| 329 | the tracker and a client is likely significantly smaller than transferred |
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| 330 | between a wireless computer and a basestation. An attacker faces a |
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| 331 | much larger task in obtaining sufficient probable plaintext to |
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| 332 | directly break the encryption.</p> |
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| 333 | <p>Hobbling the RC4 encryption by using a bounded-length RC4 pseudorandom |
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| 334 | string for small swarms is likely to have negilgible impact on |
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| 335 | security over any other encyption method since the pseudorandom string |
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| 336 | is probably equal to or longer than the plaintext and thus no part of |
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| 337 | it is repeated in the XOR except as peers arrive or leave the swarm. |
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| 338 | Thus on the timescales of rerequest intervals, nearly the same |
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| 339 | ciphertext is handed to every peer requesting the same infohash. |
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| 340 | Intercepting the same ciphertext multiple times provides no additional |
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| 341 | information to the attacker. The attacker could correlate ip-port |
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| 342 | pairs in connections following tracker responses, but an attacker |
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| 343 | could do this regardless of the encryption method employed. |
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| 344 | Furthermore more direct methods of traffic analysis applied to |
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| 345 | peer-to-peer communication is available to network operators.</p> |
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| 346 | <p>For larger swarms, hobbling RC4 may more significantly impact breaking |
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| 347 | the encryption since the same pseudorandom string is used repeatedly |
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| 348 | across the peer list. Some study is in order on this point taking |
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| 349 | into account that the tracker can periodically change intiailization |
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| 350 | vectors.</p> |
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| 351 | <p>We know from experience that periodically reshuffling peer lists on |
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| 352 | the order of the rerequest interval negligibly impacts tracker |
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| 353 | performance even with swarms containing millions of peers. Generating |
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| 354 | a new pseudorandom string using RC4 on this same time interval is |
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| 355 | likely to incur negligible performance penalty because 1) RC4 is a |
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| 356 | small constant factor more expensive than a shuffle on an input string |
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| 357 | of equal length, 2) the generated pseudorandom string is only <em>n</em> |
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| 358 | ip-port pairs long where recommended <em>n</em> is within a small constant |
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| 359 | factor larger than the largest <em>returned peer list</em> and thus much |
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| 360 | smaller than the <em>tracker peer list</em> for large swarms, and 3) the cost |
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| 361 | of the XOR operation is lighter weight than performing a random |
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| 362 | shuffle.</p> |
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| 363 | </div> |
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| 364 | <div class="section" id="references"> |
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| 365 | <h1>References</h1> |
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| 366 | <table class="docutils footnote" frame="void" id="mse" rules="none"> |
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| 367 | <colgroup><col class="label" /><col /></colgroup> |
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| 368 | <tbody valign="top"> |
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| 369 | <tr><td class="label">[1]</td><td><em>(<a class="fn-backref" href="#id1">1</a>, <a class="fn-backref" href="#id2">2</a>)</em> BitTorrent Message Stream Encryption |
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| 370 | (<a class="reference external" href="http://www.azureuswiki.com/index.php/Message_Stream_Encryption">http://www.azureuswiki.com/index.php/Message_Stream_Encryption</a>)</td></tr> |
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| 371 | </tbody> |
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| 372 | </table> |
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| 373 | <table class="docutils footnote" frame="void" id="borisov" rules="none"> |
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| 374 | <colgroup><col class="label" /><col /></colgroup> |
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| 375 | <tbody valign="top"> |
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| 376 | <tr><td class="label"><a class="fn-backref" href="#id3">[2]</a></td><td>Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, and David Wagner. Intercepting |
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| 377 | mobile communications: the insecurity of 802.11. In ACM MobiCom 2001, |
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| 378 | pages 180-189. ACM Press, 2001.</td></tr> |
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| 379 | </tbody> |
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| 380 | </table> |
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| 381 | <table class="docutils footnote" frame="void" id="scott" rules="none"> |
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| 382 | <colgroup><col class="label" /><col /></colgroup> |
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| 383 | <tbody valign="top"> |
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| 384 | <tr><td class="label"><a class="fn-backref" href="#id4">[3]</a></td><td>Scott R. Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi |
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| 385 | Shamir. Weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4. In Serge |
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| 386 | Vaudenay and Amr M. Youssef, editors, Selected Areas in |
|---|
| 387 | Cryptography 2001, volume 2259 of Lecture Notes in Computer |
|---|
| 388 | Science, pages 1-24. Springer, 2001.</td></tr> |
|---|
| 389 | </tbody> |
|---|
| 390 | </table> |
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| 391 | <table class="docutils footnote" frame="void" id="stubblefeld" rules="none"> |
|---|
| 392 | <colgroup><col class="label" /><col /></colgroup> |
|---|
| 393 | <tbody valign="top"> |
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| 394 | <tr><td class="label"><a class="fn-backref" href="#id5">[4]</a></td><td>Adam Stubblefeld, John Ioannidis, and Aviel |
|---|
| 395 | D. Rubin. A key recovery attack on the 802.11b wired equivalent |
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| 396 | privacy protocol (WEP). ACM Transactions on Information and System |
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| 397 | Security, 7(2):319-332, May 2004.</td></tr> |
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| 398 | </tbody> |
|---|
| 399 | </table> |
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| 400 | <table class="docutils footnote" frame="void" id="id6" rules="none"> |
|---|
| 401 | <colgroup><col class="label" /><col /></colgroup> |
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| 402 | <tbody valign="top"> |
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| 403 | <tr><td class="label"><a class="fn-backref" href="#id7">[5]</a></td><td><a class="reference external" href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119">http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119</a></td></tr> |
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| 404 | </tbody> |
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| 405 | </table> |
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| 406 | </div> |
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| 407 | <div class="section" id="example-python-code"> |
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| 408 | <h1>Example Python Code</h1> |
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| 409 | <p>Request handling in a dummy tracker implementing tracker peer obfuscation:</p> |
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| 410 | <pre class="literal-block"> |
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| 411 | from sha import sha |
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| 412 | from random import randint |
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| 413 | from struct import unpack |
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| 414 | from rc4 import rc4 # rc4(k) generates k RC4 pseudorandom bytes. |
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| 415 | |
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| 416 | rand = open("/dev/random","r").read |
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| 417 | rc4 = rc4() |
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| 418 | |
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| 419 | # tracker configuration |
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| 420 | MAX_PEERS = 100 |
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| 421 | |
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| 422 | # per torrent state. |
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| 423 | infohash = sha("dummy_info").digest() |
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| 424 | pseudo = '' # pseudorandom RC4 string. |
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| 425 | num_peers = 1000 # current swarm size. |
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| 426 | tracker_peer_list = rand(6) * num_peers |
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| 427 | obfuscated_tracker_peer_list = '' |
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| 428 | |
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| 429 | def xor(plaintext,pseudo): |
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| 430 | isint = False |
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| 431 | if type(plaintext) == int: # convert to byte string. |
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| 432 | plaintext = "".join([chr(int(x,16)) for x in "%.4x" % plaintext]) |
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| 433 | isint = True |
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| 434 | n = len(pseudo) |
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| 435 | ciphertext = "".join( |
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| 436 | [chr(ord(pseudo[i%n])^ord(plaintext[i])) for i in xrange(len(plaintext))]) |
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| 437 | if isint: |
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| 438 | ciphertext = unpack("!I", ciphertext)[0] # convert back to unsigned int |
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| 439 | return ciphertext |
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| 440 | |
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| 441 | def init(): # called once per rerequest interval. |
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| 442 | global iv, x, n, n_xor_y, obfuscated_tracker_peer_list |
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| 443 | iv = rand(20) |
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| 444 | rc4.key = sha(infohash + iv).digest() |
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| 445 | rc4(768) # discard first 768 |
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| 446 | x = rc4(4) |
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| 447 | y = rc4(4) |
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| 448 | n = min(num_peers, randint(MAX_PEERS * 2, MAX_PEERS * 4)) |
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| 449 | n_xor_y = xor(n,y) |
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| 450 | pseudo = rc4(n*6) |
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| 451 | obfuscated_tracker_peer_list = xor(tracker_peer_list,pseudo) |
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| 452 | |
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| 453 | def getpeers( numwant ): |
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| 454 | global iv, x, n, n_xor_y, obfuscated_tracker_peer_list |
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| 455 | response = {} |
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| 456 | response['iv'] = iv |
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| 457 | numwant = min(numwant, MAX_PEERS) |
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| 458 | if numwant >= num_peers: |
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| 459 | response['peers'] = obfuscated_tracker_peer_list |
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| 460 | return response |
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| 461 | |
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| 462 | i = randint(0,num_peers-numwant) |
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| 463 |
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